The connection between strong families and secure property rights

While doing background reading for a research project I am conducting, I came across a book by Bertrand Russell entitled Marriage and Morals, which he published in 1929. The purpose of the book is to advocate a new way of thinking about marriage and sexual morality.

Russell is a too liberal for my liking, and he doesn’t hold a high opinion of religion. For example, he gives two objectives for the book. The first is “to eliminate the elements of superstition” or religion in defining what sexual morality ought to be. The second is “to take account of those entirely new factors which make the wisdom of past ages the folly instead of the wisdom of the present.” Here he refers to things like contraception and other “modern discoveries” that supposedly enhance the sexual freedom of people by removing the worry of creating an unwanted child or experiencing other concerns. At one point in the book Russell laments that people still have “fears” that are “irrational,” because of the “failure of psychological adaptation” to the new morality he advocates.

While I disagree with the overall message of the book, Russell makes a rather interesting observation about the importance of the family and the connection between family and secure property rights. In the first chapter, Russell states that one of the most important reasons that people engage in economic activity is to provide food and other benefits not merely for themselves but “for the sake of the family”. He then says that “as the family system changes, economic motives also change.” For example, without a family there is little motive for an adult to purchase life insurance. Moreover, “most forms of private saving would nearly cease if children were taken away from their parents and brought up by the State as in Plato’s Republic; that is to say, if the State were to adopt the role of the father, the State would, ipso factor, become the sole capitalist.” He continues by saying “that if the State is to be the sole capitalist, the family, as we have known it, cannot survive … [for] it is impossible to deny an intimate connection between private property and the family, a connection which is reciprocal.”

In other words, we need private property for the good of the family, and we need family for the preservation of property rights. If property rights are weakened, then we weaken the family. If the family is weakened, then we lose the basis for protecting private property. One feeds the other. In the extreme, if family is incapable of properly rearing children–or if the government claims that the family cannot effectively raise children–so that the State must take over that responsibility, then the power of government to take and control property will be at its greatest. I should add that Russell was an admirer of the Soviet Union, although he never fully embraced communism.

I’ve never thought about the connection between family and property rights until now. I find the connection very interesting. Implications? Well, if you believe in the importance of family, then fight to preserve rights to property. And if you believe in the importance of protecting private property, then fight for strong families. We need both for a stable and healthy society.

Declining moral values in the U.S.

An important area of research for me involves the study of how moral values relate to economic conditions of society and the well-being of individuals. For example, a few years ago I published a study (here) describing how to measure the generalized morality of countries, and I linked that measure to economic conditions within countries. Currently I am trying to understand trends in moral values and how and why they change over time.

It is not uncommon for people to bemoan a decline in moral values. For example, in 2015 a Gallup Poll (here) found that “Most Americans (72%) continue to believe the state of moral values in the U.S. is ‘getting worse,’ while 22% say it is ‘getting better.'” But is there evidence supporting the ‘decline in moral values’ story? Yes, at least in the United States.

I like working with a database called the World Values Survey, which is a compilation of face-to-face interviews with adult citizens ages 18 and older conducted in many countries around the world. Respondents are asked many questions about what they believe, such as perspectives about religion, politics, social values, and so forth. The survey is conducted in multiyear waves about every five years or so. It began in 1981. The most recent wave in which data is available (number 6) began in 2010 and involves work in 57 countries around the world with more than 85,000 respondents. The organization behind the study is currently preparing for the next round of studies.

Note the following two charts for respondents in the United States. The data are reported for each of the six waves. The number of respondents in each wave is at least 1,000 (and so allows for meaningful statistical analyses).

Social trends

This first chart (‘trends in social values’) shows the percent of people who believe that different social issues are not justifiable. There is a clear downward trend. If these represent genuine moral values, then here is the evidence. I could add others. For example, in 1981, 69 percent of people believed that prostitution was not justifiable, but in 2005 the number declined to 47 percent.

Economic trends

This next chart (‘trends in socio-economic values’) shows the percent of people who believe that certain actions by individuals are not justifiable. There is also a downward trend, although it is not as pronounced as is the case for social values. I call these ‘socio-economic values’ because I use them to construct my measure of ‘generalized morality’ mentioned above.

Why is there a decline in moral values? Well, that’s the million dollar question. While we can easily point to correlations, identifying causality is notoriously difficult in social science research. But sometimes correlations suggest patterns and plausible explanations. For example, declining religiosity and confidence in churches might be an explanation. Religions have traditionally played a major role in articulating moral standards in society. If people become less religious and are less tied to churches over time, then that might explain why moral values decline.


Consider this chart (‘importance of religion’), which shows various indicators of religiosity. While most people in the United States continue to believe in God (almost 90% according to the most recent wave of the World Values Survey), they are becoming less connected to Him. For example, only about 60 percent of people believe that God is important to them. There is also an alarming decline in confidence in churches. In 1981, 46 percent of people had a lot of confidence in churches, but in 2010 the percent had declined by more than half to 19 percent. If we don’t trust our churches then we will not trust what is taught there, such as being moral and having high moral standards.

At the risk of being accused of confusing correlation with causation and overlooking the many complicated factors affecting moral values in society, I am tempted to call this one. We need a spiritual and religious revival in the United States if we want to see a reversal of declining moral values in society. We need to go back to church. We need to listen to preachers and Sunday School teachers. We need to study scriptures and pray and do other religiously meaningful things. If we believe in God, then we need Him to be important to us. Why not. We’re important to Him.

The latest issue of Agriculture and Human Values is in print

TheAHV_10460 latest issue of the academic journal I edit, Agriculture and Human Values, has just been published. This is the official journal of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society. The table of contents to issue 1 of volume 34 is here.

A brief summary of the articles in this issue is as follows: Fouilleux and Loconto examine the conventionalization of organic agriculture through the perspective of tripartite standards regime of governance. Jones et al examine the perceptions of students from developing countries about agriculture as an occupation. Contzen and Forney introduce a typology of farm family configurations in a study of Swiss farming. Mann and Bonanomi offer a framework for assessing the ethical implications of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries. Papaoikonomou and Ginieis assess the transformative nature of local food systems by focusing on the practices, narratives about and governance characteristics of CSAs in Spain and New York City. Arcari uses discourse analysis to examine how meat and animals are discussed and framed in debates about animal agriculture. Stone and Glover use the lens of embeddedness to examine “rice worlds” of the Green Revolution, Golden Rice and heirloom landrace rice. Kurth and Glasbergen examine the effectiveness of halal certification organizations in a study focusing on the Netherlands. Bellante uses a case study of a local food movement in Mexico to provide a more balanced view of their advantages and limitations. Poulsen examines the degree to which urban farms are able to overcome critiques about civic agriculture. Desmarais et al document changing land ownership patterns in Canada. Zepeda and Reznickova describe the evolution of a Slow Food movement at the University of Wisconsin. Additionally, Jennifer Clapp, S. Ryan Isakson and Oane Visser introduce a collection of four papers on the complex dynamics of agriculture as a financial asset. The issue also contains book reviews and a list of books received.

Corruption, 2016

Transparency International is a non-governmental organization, headquartered in Berlin, with a mission to document and root out public corruption worldwide. The organization defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.”

For more than two decades Transparency International has produced an annual Corruption Perceptions Index. The most recent edition of the index (here) ranks 176 countries from the least corrupt to the most corrupt. The index ranges from a scale of 0 to 100, “where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption.” The Index  “aggregates data from a number of different sources that provide perceptions of business people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector.”


The least corrupt countries are Denmark, New Zealand, Finland and Sweden. They always stay at the top of the list. The most corrupt countries are Syria, North Korea, South Sudan and Somalia. Denmark’s score is 90 while Somalia’s is 10. The United States is number 18 on the list, with a score of 74, below Canada, Germany and the UK. That’s alarming. Not that the US is below other countries but that the US is more than halfway to the midpoint of the CPI scale (Slovakia and Croatia have scores of 51 and 49 respectively).

Corruption matters because it erodes public trust in government and business, and trust is very important for promoting economic growth and well-being. For example, note the following figure I produced showing the correlation between corruption and per capita gross domestic product. Of course, correlation does not mean causation. And we can debate whether corruption produces low growth or whether low growth invites corruption, but the correlation is stark. Highly corrupt countries are very poor. Moreover, for every 10 point improvement in a country’s perceived corruption, GDP per capita increases by more than $7,000 (that’s what the equation in the figure shows).


Transparency International also draws a connection between corruption and social inequality. As noted on their website (here): “it’s timely to look at the links between populism, socio-economic malaise and the anti-corruption agenda. Indeed, [US President] Trump and many other populist leaders regularly make a connection between a ‘corrupt elite’  interested only in enriching themselves and their (rich) supporters and the marginalisation of ‘working people’. Is there evidence to back this up? Yes. Corruption and social inequality are indeed closely related and provide a source for popular discontent. Yet, the track record of populist leaders in tackling this problem is dismal; they use the corruption-inequality message to drum up support but have no intention of tackling the problem seriously.”

In other words, we preach virtues but don’t practice them ourselves.

Which reminds me. After discussing these ideas in my applied ethics class I suggested that students can obtain an automatic A in the class if they leave me a $100 bill with their name written on it in pencil. Some students laughed while others wanted to negotiate the price. Apparently they didn’t learn anything.

The Winter of Our Discontent and our identity

woodFor the past several years I have required students in my applied ethics course to read John Steinbeck’s book, The Winter of Our Discontent. The story, which takes place in the early 1960s in a fictional East Coast town called New Baytown, is about the moral decline of a man named Ethan. At the beginning of the book Ethan is content and has a reputation for integrity. By the end of the book Ethan has engaged in a number of morally corrupt activities in order to obtain wealth and status.

I like the book because it is one of the best novels showing the dilemma people face when tempted to do bad things and the heartache people inevitably feel because of their actions. Steinbeck takes us into the mind of Ethan as he rationalizes what he does. “What are morals? … Is there a check in men, deep in them, that stops or punishes? There doesn’t seem to be,” says Ethan. That’s a scary way to justify one’s behavior.

The class discussions of this book are always interesting. Students generally agree that the things Ethan did were wrong and that Steinbeck did a good job in showing that happiness in life does not come from doing bad things to get ahead or merely from the acquisition of wealth. However, students differ in the lessons they learned from the book.

Some students drew connections with teachings from their parents and churches about the importance of doing good and being good, even when others around us are not.

Some students felt that experience is the best teacher in life. That is, we learn right and wrong by choosing wrong and then by seeing that it does not get us what we expected. Only rarely can one be “taught” that something is wrong and that such teaching will be sufficient to keep us on the moral high ground. In other words, the only way we can learn that stealing is wrong is to steal, get caught and be punished. Having someone who says they know better and who tells us it is wrong and that we can never “prosper” by stealing is not good enough.

Some students believed in the power of example and of a good role model. If there is someone we admire who behaves ethically, then we might be more inclined to avoid the temptations to lie, cheat and steal. But what if we associate with people who do not value integrity?

An important lesson is where our sense of identity comes from. If we require validation from others, then we will be susceptible to pressures to acquire riches at any cost. That is, we will become like Ethan. You’ll have to read the book to understand why. (The book would carry a PG rating for adult themes and mild language.)

An alternative objective would be to find validation from within, or, better yet, to consider “what thinks God of me?” There is an extensive scholarly literature on the subject of religiosity and identity. Scholars have noted that religions provide a strong effect on the way people see themselves and the world. But that can come at a cost, for example, if one’s religious identity is threatened by intergroup conflict. When one’s religion is attacked, then having an identity too strongly tied to the religion may create a risk that people will take extreme actions in order to protect their identity and worldview (see, for instance, a paper entitled “Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion From a Social Identity Perspective.” But havin51lkrhfbuelg one’s sense of identity tied to one’s religion is not the same as considering “what thinks God of me?” An excellent religious perspective of this theme is here. I’m also reminded of a wonderful book, You Are Specialby Max Lucado, that makes the same point.

I know I’ve gone off track a bit, since I started this post with Steinbeck’s book. But since my identity is not based on what I think others think of my blogging, I guess it doesn’t really matter.

Doing bad when I think I’m good

A perplexing question in social science research is why people behave in ways inconsistent with their beliefs and their perceptions about themselves. For example, if we know it is wrong to lie, cheat or steal, then why do people lie, cheat or steal? Economists might say people conduct a rational analysis to assess the benefits of lying, cheating or stealing relative to the costs of getting caught or having a guilty conscience and will behave inappropriately when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Psychologists might look to the internalized norms and values of people and say they will lie, cheat or steal when their internal value systems become corrupted. But what if people maintain a strong internal value system but still lie, cheat or steal? Is it possible for me to behave dishonestly and still consider myself an honest person? The question is not trivial. Consider these variations:

I see myself as a person dedicated to healthy eating and exercise but who routinely (over)indulges in sugary and unhealthy foods.

I see myself as a person who values education and a growing intellect but who routinely watches too much television or plays too many games on a smartphone or tablet.

I see myself as a person who is fair and impartial but who regularly denigrates the statements of persons whose political views differ from mine.

I see myself as a person who treats others with dignity and respect but who often hurls insults at political opponents because its just “politics”.

I see myself as a religious person but who rarely attends church or reads scriptures and prays.

I see myself as a competent and careful blogger but who infrequently adds new posts to his blog or reads and comments on the blog postings of others.

A study published in 2008, entitled The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, provides a compelling insight here. According to the authors of the study, people have and want to maintain a particular image of themselves, such as being a person of honesty. A problem arises when people face a decision that can produce a short-term gain but require them to act in a way that is contrary to their self-image or self-concept. When people are torn by competing motivations–“gaining from cheating versus maintaining a positive self-concept as honest”–they will solve this dilemma “by finding a balance or equilibrium between the two motivating forces, such that they derive some financial benefit from behaving dishonestly but still maintain their positive self-concept in terms of being honest.” But how? The trick is to define the behavior in a way that still allows them to maintain the desired self-concept. The authors describe this as malleability. The more malleable the situation, the more likely people will behave inappropriately while still maintaining a positive self-concept. Consider this variation of an example provided by the authors: I might be able to justify taking a $1 notebook from my friend, even if I cannot justify stealing $1 from his wallet to buy the notebook myself. The malleability here comes from my defining this action as “borrowing” rather than stealing, or thinking that because I let my friend use something of mine previously, then my taking the notebook is okay because “this is what friends do.” Of course, there is limit to this rationalization. I might be able to rationalize taking the $1 notebook but probably not taking my friend’s $20,000 car. Thus, malleability and limits set the boundaries within which rationalization occurs.

The scholars conducted experiments to see how people behave when given opportunities to cheat and to redefine how they see themselves. The experiments confirmed their expectations. As summarized by the authors, “people who think highly of themselves in terms of honesty make use of various mechanisms that allow them to engage in a limited amount of dishonesty while retaining positive views of themselves. In other words, there is a band of acceptable dishonesty that is limited by internal reward considerations.” In other words, I can lie as long as I can convince myself it is really not lying. If I can do this easily, then good for me. I get my lie and self-worth too. If I cannot do this easily, then I’ll resign myself to being honest.

So, if we want to reduce dishonesty in society, we need to limit the malleability of contexts in which people might lie, cheat or steal. In other words, we need to make it harder for people to rationalize their unethical behavior that allows them to maintain a positive self-concept even though they are doing wrong. In their study, the authors were able to do this by asking the subjects of their experiments to write down as many of the Ten Commandments as they could remember. Perhaps this means we should be promoting greater religious observance in society.

Lying is still lying, regardless of what we want to call it. Cheating is still cheating. And stealing is still stealing. All our wrong. We need to call it what it is.

Phew! That was a lot of work creating this post. Time for this healthy exerciser to take a chocolate break.