Doing good makes you want to do more good

Can you learn to be kinder, more charitable and helpful? If so, then what can you do to increase such virtuous feelings and tendencies? A recent study published by economists (no kidding!) showed that there is a correlation between altruistic acts and increased preferences for doing altruistic acts. The study, “Altruistic Capital,” was published in the American Economic Review.

Most economists assume that preferences are fixed. That is, my preference for being kind or for wearing blue colored shirts or for eating chocolate will not change. In contrast, the authors assume that preferences for altruism can change. They liken altruism to a type of capital. Just as physical capital (machinery, buildings, etc) or human capital (learning, skills, etc) can be enhanced through investments in machinery or learning, altruistic capital can be enhanced through investments. What investments increase altruistic capital? Doing altruistic acts. In other words, doing good increases the desire for and perceived benefits from doing good.

The authors conducted a study of persons working in the banking industry and showed that “altruistic capital grows proportionally to the effort devoted to altruistic tasks,” consistent with Aristotle’s assertion that “virtue is an asset that grows through righteous acts” (quoting the authors). Specifically, the authors found that “employee’s perceived returns to altruistic acts … are [positively] associated with more prosocial behavior at work.” In other words, getting people to do good can create a “virtuous circle”, where doing good increases the perceived personal benefits of doing good, which in turn increases the desire for and tendency to engage in good acts, such as cooperation with others.

We need more good in the world. So do some good, and bring someone with you when you do.

Another issue of Agriculture and Human Values is ready

The latest issue of the academic journal I edit, volume 34, issue 2, of Agriculture and Human Values, has just been published online (here).

A brief summary of the articles in this issue is as follows: Sippel et al assess the nature and impact of the financialization of farmland in Australia. Hill and Raster evaluate the rights of the Ojibwe people in Minnesota to control access to and use of wild rice fields in the face of appropriation by university researchers and others seeking to develop hybrid and genetically modified rice varieties. Mills et al examine factors affecting the willingness and ability of farmers to adopt environmental management practices. Clark et al report on perspectives of cooperative extension educators about food system change. Lyon et al assess the impact on women of their increasing participation rates in fair-trade coffee production in Oaxaca, Mexico. Roesch-McNally et al report on a survey of Midwest US farmers to determine factors affecting their intention to adapt farming practices in response to climate variability. Sumner et al study gender differences in the practice of conservation agriculture of smallholder farmers in Cambodia. Liu et al assess the community-building aspect of community supported agriculture in China and the UK. Orozco-Ramírezab and Astier study socio-economic factors expected to affect the genetic erosion of local maize varieties in Mexico. Bergstra et al assess the attitudes of different stakeholder groups in the Netherlands toward specific pig husbandry practices. Mars and Schau examine the role of entrepreneurship in facilitating local food system initiatives. Mason et al use a gendered mobilities framework to understand better how the movement of men and women in rural Tanzania affect their level of food security. Galt et al report on a survey of members of a community supported agriculture project in California to assess how member income affects participation and other considerations. Adolwa et al study how agricultural innovations are disseminated in two farming regions of Kenya and Ghana. Helliwell and Tomei assess the environmental stewardship implications of EU goernance policies on the biofuel industries in the UK and Guatemala. Sarmiento reviews and describes different strands of literature on alternative food networks.

The connection between strong families and secure property rights

While doing background reading for a research project I am conducting, I came across a book by Bertrand Russell entitled Marriage and Morals, which he published in 1929. The purpose of the book is to advocate a new way of thinking about marriage and sexual morality.

Russell is a too liberal for my liking, and he doesn’t hold a high opinion of religion. For example, he gives two objectives for the book. The first is “to eliminate the elements of superstition” or religion in defining what sexual morality ought to be. The second is “to take account of those entirely new factors which make the wisdom of past ages the folly instead of the wisdom of the present.” Here he refers to things like contraception and other “modern discoveries” that supposedly enhance the sexual freedom of people by removing the worry of creating an unwanted child or experiencing other concerns. At one point in the book Russell laments that people still have “fears” that are “irrational,” because of the “failure of psychological adaptation” to the new morality he advocates.

While I disagree with the overall message of the book, Russell makes a rather interesting observation about the importance of the family and the connection between family and secure property rights. In the first chapter, Russell states that one of the most important reasons that people engage in economic activity is to provide food and other benefits not merely for themselves but “for the sake of the family”. He then says that “as the family system changes, economic motives also change.” For example, without a family there is little motive for an adult to purchase life insurance. Moreover, “most forms of private saving would nearly cease if children were taken away from their parents and brought up by the State as in Plato’s Republic; that is to say, if the State were to adopt the role of the father, the State would, ipso factor, become the sole capitalist.” He continues by saying “that if the State is to be the sole capitalist, the family, as we have known it, cannot survive … [for] it is impossible to deny an intimate connection between private property and the family, a connection which is reciprocal.”

In other words, we need private property for the good of the family, and we need family for the preservation of property rights. If property rights are weakened, then we weaken the family. If the family is weakened, then we lose the basis for protecting private property. One feeds the other. In the extreme, if family is incapable of properly rearing children–or if the government claims that the family cannot effectively raise children–so that the State must take over that responsibility, then the power of government to take and control property will be at its greatest. I should add that Russell was an admirer of the Soviet Union, although he never fully embraced communism.

I’ve never thought about the connection between family and property rights until now. I find the connection very interesting. Implications? Well, if you believe in the importance of family, then fight to preserve rights to property. And if you believe in the importance of protecting private property, then fight for strong families. We need both for a stable and healthy society.

The latest issue of Agriculture and Human Values is in print

TheAHV_10460 latest issue of the academic journal I edit, Agriculture and Human Values, has just been published. This is the official journal of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society. The table of contents to issue 1 of volume 34 is here.

A brief summary of the articles in this issue is as follows: Fouilleux and Loconto examine the conventionalization of organic agriculture through the perspective of tripartite standards regime of governance. Jones et al examine the perceptions of students from developing countries about agriculture as an occupation. Contzen and Forney introduce a typology of farm family configurations in a study of Swiss farming. Mann and Bonanomi offer a framework for assessing the ethical implications of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries. Papaoikonomou and Ginieis assess the transformative nature of local food systems by focusing on the practices, narratives about and governance characteristics of CSAs in Spain and New York City. Arcari uses discourse analysis to examine how meat and animals are discussed and framed in debates about animal agriculture. Stone and Glover use the lens of embeddedness to examine “rice worlds” of the Green Revolution, Golden Rice and heirloom landrace rice. Kurth and Glasbergen examine the effectiveness of halal certification organizations in a study focusing on the Netherlands. Bellante uses a case study of a local food movement in Mexico to provide a more balanced view of their advantages and limitations. Poulsen examines the degree to which urban farms are able to overcome critiques about civic agriculture. Desmarais et al document changing land ownership patterns in Canada. Zepeda and Reznickova describe the evolution of a Slow Food movement at the University of Wisconsin. Additionally, Jennifer Clapp, S. Ryan Isakson and Oane Visser introduce a collection of four papers on the complex dynamics of agriculture as a financial asset. The issue also contains book reviews and a list of books received.

The Winter of Our Discontent and our identity

woodFor the past several years I have required students in my applied ethics course to read John Steinbeck’s book, The Winter of Our Discontent. The story, which takes place in the early 1960s in a fictional East Coast town called New Baytown, is about the moral decline of a man named Ethan. At the beginning of the book Ethan is content and has a reputation for integrity. By the end of the book Ethan has engaged in a number of morally corrupt activities in order to obtain wealth and status.

I like the book because it is one of the best novels showing the dilemma people face when tempted to do bad things and the heartache people inevitably feel because of their actions. Steinbeck takes us into the mind of Ethan as he rationalizes what he does. “What are morals? … Is there a check in men, deep in them, that stops or punishes? There doesn’t seem to be,” says Ethan. That’s a scary way to justify one’s behavior.

The class discussions of this book are always interesting. Students generally agree that the things Ethan did were wrong and that Steinbeck did a good job in showing that happiness in life does not come from doing bad things to get ahead or merely from the acquisition of wealth. However, students differ in the lessons they learned from the book.

Some students drew connections with teachings from their parents and churches about the importance of doing good and being good, even when others around us are not.

Some students felt that experience is the best teacher in life. That is, we learn right and wrong by choosing wrong and then by seeing that it does not get us what we expected. Only rarely can one be “taught” that something is wrong and that such teaching will be sufficient to keep us on the moral high ground. In other words, the only way we can learn that stealing is wrong is to steal, get caught and be punished. Having someone who says they know better and who tells us it is wrong and that we can never “prosper” by stealing is not good enough.

Some students believed in the power of example and of a good role model. If there is someone we admire who behaves ethically, then we might be more inclined to avoid the temptations to lie, cheat and steal. But what if we associate with people who do not value integrity?

An important lesson is where our sense of identity comes from. If we require validation from others, then we will be susceptible to pressures to acquire riches at any cost. That is, we will become like Ethan. You’ll have to read the book to understand why. (The book would carry a PG rating for adult themes and mild language.)

An alternative objective would be to find validation from within, or, better yet, to consider “what thinks God of me?” There is an extensive scholarly literature on the subject of religiosity and identity. Scholars have noted that religions provide a strong effect on the way people see themselves and the world. But that can come at a cost, for example, if one’s religious identity is threatened by intergroup conflict. When one’s religion is attacked, then having an identity too strongly tied to the religion may create a risk that people will take extreme actions in order to protect their identity and worldview (see, for instance, a paper entitled “Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion From a Social Identity Perspective.” But havin51lkrhfbuelg one’s sense of identity tied to one’s religion is not the same as considering “what thinks God of me?” An excellent religious perspective of this theme is here. I’m also reminded of a wonderful book, You Are Specialby Max Lucado, that makes the same point.

I know I’ve gone off track a bit, since I started this post with Steinbeck’s book. But since my identity is not based on what I think others think of my blogging, I guess it doesn’t really matter.

Doing bad when I think I’m good

A perplexing question in social science research is why people behave in ways inconsistent with their beliefs and their perceptions about themselves. For example, if we know it is wrong to lie, cheat or steal, then why do people lie, cheat or steal? Economists might say people conduct a rational analysis to assess the benefits of lying, cheating or stealing relative to the costs of getting caught or having a guilty conscience and will behave inappropriately when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Psychologists might look to the internalized norms and values of people and say they will lie, cheat or steal when their internal value systems become corrupted. But what if people maintain a strong internal value system but still lie, cheat or steal? Is it possible for me to behave dishonestly and still consider myself an honest person? The question is not trivial. Consider these variations:

I see myself as a person dedicated to healthy eating and exercise but who routinely (over)indulges in sugary and unhealthy foods.

I see myself as a person who values education and a growing intellect but who routinely watches too much television or plays too many games on a smartphone or tablet.

I see myself as a person who is fair and impartial but who regularly denigrates the statements of persons whose political views differ from mine.

I see myself as a person who treats others with dignity and respect but who often hurls insults at political opponents because its just “politics”.

I see myself as a religious person but who rarely attends church or reads scriptures and prays.

I see myself as a competent and careful blogger but who infrequently adds new posts to his blog or reads and comments on the blog postings of others.

A study published in 2008, entitled The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, provides a compelling insight here. According to the authors of the study, people have and want to maintain a particular image of themselves, such as being a person of honesty. A problem arises when people face a decision that can produce a short-term gain but require them to act in a way that is contrary to their self-image or self-concept. When people are torn by competing motivations–“gaining from cheating versus maintaining a positive self-concept as honest”–they will solve this dilemma “by finding a balance or equilibrium between the two motivating forces, such that they derive some financial benefit from behaving dishonestly but still maintain their positive self-concept in terms of being honest.” But how? The trick is to define the behavior in a way that still allows them to maintain the desired self-concept. The authors describe this as malleability. The more malleable the situation, the more likely people will behave inappropriately while still maintaining a positive self-concept. Consider this variation of an example provided by the authors: I might be able to justify taking a $1 notebook from my friend, even if I cannot justify stealing $1 from his wallet to buy the notebook myself. The malleability here comes from my defining this action as “borrowing” rather than stealing, or thinking that because I let my friend use something of mine previously, then my taking the notebook is okay because “this is what friends do.” Of course, there is limit to this rationalization. I might be able to rationalize taking the $1 notebook but probably not taking my friend’s $20,000 car. Thus, malleability and limits set the boundaries within which rationalization occurs.

The scholars conducted experiments to see how people behave when given opportunities to cheat and to redefine how they see themselves. The experiments confirmed their expectations. As summarized by the authors, “people who think highly of themselves in terms of honesty make use of various mechanisms that allow them to engage in a limited amount of dishonesty while retaining positive views of themselves. In other words, there is a band of acceptable dishonesty that is limited by internal reward considerations.” In other words, I can lie as long as I can convince myself it is really not lying. If I can do this easily, then good for me. I get my lie and self-worth too. If I cannot do this easily, then I’ll resign myself to being honest.

So, if we want to reduce dishonesty in society, we need to limit the malleability of contexts in which people might lie, cheat or steal. In other words, we need to make it harder for people to rationalize their unethical behavior that allows them to maintain a positive self-concept even though they are doing wrong. In their study, the authors were able to do this by asking the subjects of their experiments to write down as many of the Ten Commandments as they could remember. Perhaps this means we should be promoting greater religious observance in society.

Lying is still lying, regardless of what we want to call it. Cheating is still cheating. And stealing is still stealing. All our wrong. We need to call it what it is.

Phew! That was a lot of work creating this post. Time for this healthy exerciser to take a chocolate break.